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Abstract
This paper deals with the situation in the European car industry since the crisis
of the early 1990s. After a short review of the structural problems of the
industry and the main responses by car manufacturers, the discussion shifts to
a detailed analysis of labour union responses. The paper discusses two broad
stages in labour responses. The first consisted of the traditional social plans
and early retirement measures that had been at the core of labour union
strategies before. The second is a broader strategy, which trades working time
reduction, working time flexibility and wage concessions for job security and
investment guarantees. A detailed analysis of such agreements in five car-
producing European countries --Germany, France, Spain, the UK and Belgium-
- as well as two detailed case studies of the competitive dynamic between local
unions in different countries prompted by these agreements --in GM Europe
and Renault-- illustrates the main strengths and weaknesses of this strategy.
While these agreements may be able to secure employment, they also install a
competitive spiral on working conditions among unions. The paper then
discusses the contours of an alternative strategy that attempts to avoid inter-
union competition, and the role for institutions such as European Works
Councils in this alternative.
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Studie befaßt sich mit der Situation der europäischen
Autoindustrie seit der Krise Anfang der 90er Jahre. Auf eine kurze
Beschreibung branchenspezifischer struktureller Probleme sowie der
Reaktionen seitens der Autohersteller folgt eine detaillierte Analyse der
gewerkschaftlichen Reaktionen.
Diskutiert werden zwei Schritte in diesem Reaktionsprozeß. Der erste Schritt
bestand aus traditionellen Sozialplänen und Maßnahmen zum vorzeitigen
Ruhestand, die schon vorher ein Kernelement gewerkschaftlicher Strategien
ausgemacht hatten. Der zweite Schritt beinhaltet eine breitere Strategie, in
welcher Arbeitszeitverkürzung, Arbeitszeitflexibilität und Lohnkonzessionen
gegen Arbeitsplatz- und Investitionsgarantien eingetauscht werden sollen. Eine
gründliche Untersuchung derartiger Abkommen in fünf europäischen
Autoindustrien (Deutschland, Frankreich, Spanien, Großbritannien und
Belgien) sowie zwei detaillierte Fallstudien der durch diese Abkommen
ausgelösten kompetitiven Dynamik zwischen lokalen Gewerkschaften in
verschiedenen Ländern (GM Europa und Renault) illustrieren die wesentlichen
Vor-und Nachteile dieser zweiten Strategie. Während derartige Abkommen
möglicherweise Arbeitsplätze sichern helfen, führen sie gleichzeitig zu einer
Wettbewerbsspirale in Bezug auf die Arbeitsbedingungen der Gewerkschaften.
Im Anschluß an diese Analyse werden die Grundzüge einer alternativen
Strategie diskutiert, mit deren Hilfe zwischengewerkschaftliche Konkurrenz
verhindert werden soll. Die Rolle von Institutionen, wie sie beispielsweise der
Europäische Betriebsrat in dieser Alternative einnimmt, wird ebenfalls
untersucht.
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1. The European car industry: a sector in structural crisis
Recent good news about record profits should not fool us: the European car industry
is and remains a sector in crisis. Since the late 1980s, but hidden by the economic
boom following German unification and therefore obvious to all only after 1992, the
automobile industry in Europe has entered a period of profound restructuring. The
reasons for the crisis are structural: European car markets are slowly reaching a
level of saturation comparable to what the US car markets have known since the
mid-1970s. Yet despite the structural weakness of demand, car manufacturers have
continued to increase their production capacity and the result is currently an esti-
mated excess capacity in Europe of the order of 25-30% (most cars made in Europe
are also sold on this continent). The excess capacity follows directly from the large
number of individual producers in different segments, who are all optimistic about
their own market prospects and therefore have increased their capacity. In the words
of management of some of the powerful German companies: “the others have ex-
cess capacity” (Piëch in Die Welt); and „there are too many cars in the world, but not
enough of them are BMW“ (Berndt Pischetsrieder).
How and why we ended up in a situation of structurally depressed demand is
relatively easy to understand. First of all, in comparison with the US or Japan,
Europe still has many independent mass producers: ten in all, six of which compete
in the same volume market (Fiat, Ford, GM Europe, PSA Group, Renault, VW
Group) and the remaining four in the luxury market (BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Volvo,
Audi). Furthermore, the main Japanese producers have also set up plants in the EU,
as have Korean producers who are slowly showing up. Combined, there are 166
parts and final assembly plants in the European Union. This situation has created a
gigantic potential over-supply. Secondly, on the demand side, things are at least as
problematic: several years of austerity plans have seriously reduced the purchasing
power of car buyers and since the adoption of the Maastricht criteria, this broad
macro-economic problem has taken on structural characteristics. Furthermore, for
the few exporters (primarily the high-end luxury car producers) the exchange rate
policies of the Bundesbank and of the other central banks which were forced to fol-
low the German Mark, have made the situation even worse. Finally, consumers see
cars increasingly in a new, different and more critical light: they are regarded as
2major polluters, who are making streets unsafe and creating tremendous traffic
problems in all major European cities.
This problem will not find an easy solution. Instead of rationalising their pro-
duction apparatus, most producers are increasing capacity, especially in the current
phase of the cycle, while governments are helping national industries with subsidies,
aids and new car premiums. The macro-economic regime associated with the intro-
duction of the Euro is very likely to perpetuate the current low-growth situation; little
relief is therefore to be expected from that side. One could envision new markets
opening up in the Central European states or in the Newly Industrialising Countries
in South-East Asia (before the current financial and economic crisis) and Latin
America, but even these new growth markets are not likely to increase production in
the core countries since in these regions manufacturers have set up operations that
supply their home base at much lower costs than any traditional European plant
could do. Additionally, because every producer is more or less in the same situation,
the increased search for cost competitiveness will continue to drive up labour pro-
ductivity and thus contribute to the problem, by creating ever more excess capacity.
This report discusses this crisis and its social consequences. It starts with an
analytical summary of management responses (section 2), and the evolution of la-
bour union strategies to deal with the crisis (section 3). The fourth section will be
devoted entirely to a novel type of collective agreements, which aim at securing em-
ployment and investment commitments. After a review of the benefits and disadvan-
tages of these new agreements, section 6 will discuss outlines of alternative strate-
gies for employment security.
2. Responses by the car manufacturers
Management responded to the crisis with two strategies. The first, following the pub-
lication of the IMVP-MIT report consisted of a relentless drive to reduce production
costs. This entailed a generalised introduction of lean production and cost reduction
programs. In some countries where the crisis hit earlier, such as France, this proc-
ess was more or less established by the late 1980s, whereas others, especially the
German and Swedish industries who had been immune to the crisis of the early
1980s, were hit surprisingly hard by the crisis of the 1990s and were forced to intro-
duce new production methods rapidly.
3This micro-economic strategy, in turn, was predicated upon the introduction of
new concepts of product development that allowed for a reorganisation of links with
suppliers. Increasingly parts and processes were standardised, and cars were seen
as collections of interchangeable modules. Such a reconfiguration of the product
architecture, which finds its expression in the currently much-discussed platform
strategy and the generalisation of ISO 9000 quality management standards through-
out the entire European car industry are a necessity for making the new supplier
policies --in any combination of forward, global and single sourcing-- a success.
The result was that many car manufacturers were able to start a slow but radi-
cal reorganisation of their product line-up, in which they were forced to increase vol-
ume through a downward extension of their product range (the much publicised
moves into the high luxury end are really only that --much publicised moves-- which
may well be very costly for some; this market segment may simply be too small to
accommodate much competition). In other words, car manufacturers entered new,
relatively lower value-added market segments, such as, for example, the VW Polo &
Lupo and the Renault Twingo; and even the high-end manufacturers have gradually
moved downward in the market segments: for example, Mercedes C-Class & A-
Class, as well as the Swatch; the BMW 316; and the Volvo 4-series.
The second strategy follows from this new model of product architecture. In or-
der to spread the costs of parts purchasing, more models are being built today than
a few years ago. However, this led to a dramatic increase of development costs and
other fixed costs associated with manufacturing, such as machinery and factories.
Every model, even if it is built on the same platform as others, requires at least in
part a separate development process, and in some cases the costs associated with
that cover as much as the profits of two full production years of the eventual model.
Furthermore, since cars have to be built on dedicated lines, this, again, raises fixed
costs.
The somewhat paradoxical result of the adjustment strategies was therefore
that, despite the cost reduction drive, profit margins per car actually decreased. This
required producing an ever higher number of cars in order to stabilise overall corpo-
rate profit rates, which explains in large measure how we ended up with the dramatic
expansion of capacity despite stagnating consumer markets, and which is also at the
basis of the process of concentration we witness today (Daimler-Chrysler, VW-
4SEAT-Skoda, BMW-Rover). Only an expansion of production volume allows for an
amortisation of these additional costs.
The employment effects of this management-initiated restructuring program
have been dramatic. Since 1991, 200.000 jobs were lost in the European car indus-
try, and the increases we see today in some countries --Germany, Spain and to a
lesser extent Belgium-- are unlikely to raise employment to the pre-1991 peak level.
In fact, the generalised introduction of lean production methods and the attempts to
increase outsourcing are likely to lead to more rather than less pressure on employ-
ment.
3. Trade union responses: two stages
Labour unions' analysis of the crisis went from cyclical to structural, and this shift is
reflected in the strategies developed by the labour unions to deal with these new
problems. At first unions attempted to use existing legal and conventional instru-
ments to make employment reductions socially digestible. After the extent of the
1992 crisis had become clear, all car companies negotiated social plans, usually
built around early retirement measures for workers over 55.
Relatively rapidly, however, this way of meeting cost pressures proved insuffi-
cient, and massive layoffs were announced: in 1992 and 1993, both VW and Mer-
cedes announced several tens of thousands layoffs, for example, while Volvo an-
nounced the closure of its two innovative small plants in Sweden. Thus a new union
strategy was adopted, which revolved around exchanging working time reduction for
working time flexibility. Working time had become so important by then because it
appeared to provide the basis for a new social consensus. For management it was
desirable because flexible working time patterns allowed for a more rational use of
equipment, whereas labour unions saw working time reduction as a way of compen-
sating for the employment threats that resulted from excess capacity.
The working time reduction strategy became most famous with the VW agree-
ment of 1993. Its basic idea was to cut working time by 20%, thus redistributing
amount of work over a larger group of workers, but without dramatic wage cuts (in
fact, VW and the unions agreed to redistribute the total yearly wage sum, including
wage increases, bonuses and other premiums, over 12 months, so that the monthly
net wage would remain the same, while the yearly total wage dropped some 10%). In
5exchange, management obtained the installation of a flexible working time account
system which allowed the company to adjust working time needs according to fluc-
tuations in demand.
Other companies followed rapidly, and by 1995, all major car manufacturers on
the continent where unions anticipated employment problems had negotiated similar
working time reduction and flexibility agreements with the labour unions and works
councils. By the mid-1990s, negotiated working time in most of the European car
industry was between 35 and 37 hours per week, with bands between 3 and 7 hours
per day to accommodate demand fluctuations.
Adjustments in working time had become so important in the European car in-
dustry, because they were related to the high sunk costs associated with investment
in machinery. The amortisation of the machine park was a much more important
element in the cost calculations under "lean production" than under the old system:
making working time more flexible allowed for a more optimal use of these machines,
i.e. use them when they were actually making cars that were sold/ordered by cus-
tomers.
Gradually, this second, working time-based strategy evolved into a separate
system of collective agreements, which specifically dealt with ways to secure em-
ployment and production locations in exchange for efforts by the labour unions to
make working time more flexible, lower the total wage cost, contribute to a reorgani-
sation of work, and a general commitment to support productivity increases. These
latter agreements exist in many different forms in the different countries, and they
are the subject of the next section.
4. Securing production and employment guarantees through collec-
tive bargaining
What follows analyses the agreements dealing with securing employment and pro-
duction location, that have been concluded in Europe over the last two years from
two perspectives. The first is an analysis of the type and contents of these agree-
ments in each of the countries. As we will see, the national situation as well as the
national institutional frameworks help understand the differences between different
countries. The second analysis attempts to understand the pan-European dynamic
for two companies where agreements to this effect have been concluded in different
plants in different countries: Opel and Renault. These two cases are used to demon-
6strate how the strategy in one country or plant affects the others. Without a proper
international strategy, as we will see, many of these agreements end up playing out
one plant against each other, and thus result in a downward competitive spiral where
none of the initial advantages survive.
4.1.National analyses
Of the countries under review, Germany is the only country where agreements se-
curing employment and production location ("Standortsicherungsvereinbarungen")
have explicitly been negotiated. In the other countries, however, similar agreements
have been concluded, usually as a part of regular collective bargaining, and these
agreements are included in the following analysis.
The analysis below is organised as follows: the first element is a sketch of the
general framework, then the period, the actors, contents and the review will close
with a broad stroke evaluation of the agreements. The data for the analysis were
provided by the national unions (important to note that only IG Metall has produced a
document specifically dealing with agreements securing employment and production
location).
Germany
Agreements securing employment and production location1 emerged in Germany in
the last two to three years (with the exception of the 1993-4 VW agreement) in direct
response to the restructuring in the automobile sector after the crisis of the early
1990s. All manufacturers, with the exception of BMW, have negotiated such agree-
ments. The majority of the agreements were signed in 1996 and 1997, and they usu-
ally cover the period between 1997 and 2000. Only Ford has a longer-term agree-
ment, dealing with broader strategic issues, and which covers the next 10 years (see
below).
The agreements in Germany were negotiated between the Works councils (all
IG Metall-led) and top management. In principle, the German agreements cover all
the German operations of a company: no separate plant-by-plant agreements were
negotiated. The Works council is also the institution that controls the application of
                                               
1This information is based on information provided in a document by IG Metall on Standortsicherungsverein-
barungen in the German automobile industry (on file with author). The information for the other countries was
provided by the European Metalworkers' Union and the member unions in the different automobile producing
countries in Europe (these documents are also on file with author).
7the agreements, especially but not solely the "social" parts of the agreements such
as working time, early retirement and training. An important new element in the Ger-
man agreements is that they also deal with wages, a topic which formally falls out-
side the competencies of the works councils.
Broadly speaking, there are two types of agreements. The first is relatively
conventional and is typified in the VW agreement: it deals with adjustment in per-
sonnel policies, such as working time, wages, training, etc. The second, which is
concluded in Ford and Opel, is broader in scope: the most important areas of the
Ford agreement are commitment to invest in particular plants, new models and ca-
pacity allocation, whereas the Opel agreement pays attention to the conventional
"social" areas as well as investment guarantees and new models.
In all agreements the explicit goal is to link company competitiveness, in terms
of quality, flexibility and  cost, to employment security and an upgrading of work. Al-
though none of the agreements explicitly refers to developments abroad, it is obvi-
ous from the texts that they attempt to neutralise the danger of production reloca-
tions in light of the tremendous surplus capacities that have been built up over the
last five to ten years. Several measures appear in all or almost all texts: the commit-
ment by management not to lay off workers for economic reasons and instead use
the array of measures on part-time early retirement as means to reduce the work-
force, implementation of new working time systems (usually trading WT reduction for
flexibility), training and career planning, and the agreement to reduce wage in-
creases for the period covered by the agreements. As said, Ford and Opel also in-
cluded investment and production issues in their agreements.
In all, as this short summary suggests, these agreements solidly follow the
German industrial relations model. First of all, the works council is the main agent:
unions have managed to use their strong position in the company to force manage-
ment to deal with restructuring in a socially viable manner. Secondly, the themes in
the agreements belong to the conventional union domain: with the exception of in-
vestment commitments and the discussion about capacity distribution for the next
models in Ford and Opel, as well as agreements to study insourcing as a way to se-
cure employment, the agreements pay little attention to broader strategic manage-
ment fields such as marketing, product development and work organisation.  Finally,
the substance of the measures proposed in the agreements follows the German de-
8bate: working time reduction and flexibility, early retirement measures, wages and
skills.
United Kingdom
In contrast to Germany, where every car manufacturer (with the exception of BMW)
has concluded an agreement with the works council securing employment, in the UK
the agreements are limited to only a few companies and, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, mainly related to very specific crises and/or decisions. Toyota, Nissan and
Peugeot have not concluded agreements (the first two companies have concluded
single-union agreements instead of the usual multi-union accords). Furthermore, the
institutional structure of collective bargaining in the UK is such that negotiations in
principle are decentralised. With the exception of the Rover agreement, the discus-
sions take place at plant level. The agreements do not cover a particular period, but
are either broad framework agreements or very specific texts to bridge a crisis. Even
though the labour unions are always involved, there is no overall central framework
that is then applied in the different companies.
The Rover agreement --the New Deal-- is the broadest and closest to the spirit
of the German agreements. It has been negotiated with trade union officials, and
deals with working time flexibility, skills, training and the deployment of workers in
the organisation.
In March 1998, news spread that Vauxhall (GM)  was thinking of closing one of
its UK plants. Political pressure from the government and talks with the unions con-
vinced management to reconsider the issue, and the result of the talks was a com-
mitment by the unions to participate in a productivity drive aimed at bringing produc-
tion costs in line with the German and Belgian plants, where --despite higher wages-
- cars were produced at roughly two-thirds of the UK cost level. No specific meas-
ures were mentioned. If the restructuring is successful, the model following the Vec-
tra (code-named Epsilon and scheduled to start production in 2003) will be produced
in Luton.
As said before, the agreements in the UK reflect the nature of the existing in-
stitutions of collective bargaining. Not all companies are involved, agreements are
decentralised, negotiated with outside union officials, mainly deal with ad hoc crises
and can therefore be very different from one company to another.
9Spain
In contrast to the other countries, no agreements securing employment are negoti-
ated in Spain. Instead, regular collective agreements deal with related issues; how-
ever, it is important to keep in mind that car plants in Spain do not face any reloca-
tion threats: instead, most agreements are discussing an extension of production
volume, employment and even modest wage increases.
The Spanish agreements follow the normal bargaining calendar, covering the
period 1997-2000 and because the agreements cover the usual topics of collective
bargaining, they are negotiated with the labour unions. Negotiations take place per
company: all the Renault, IVECO and Nissan plants are covered by one text for each
company (only Mercedes-Benz has two separate agreements for its two plants).
Two items prevail in the agreements. The first is the possibility of working time
extension: many agreements leave the option of working on Saturdays and Sundays,
thus increasing the total number of yearly operating days by 10 (from roughly 220 to
230). Thus, instead of working time reduction --one of the main discussion topics in
Germany, France and Belgium-- Spanish agreements propose a working time exten-
sion. The second topic which recurs regularly are new hires: roughly 76.000 workers
are currently employed in Spanish car factories, and the agreements schedule to
hire an additional five to six thousand (by converting temporary contracts into fixed-
term contracts) between 1997 and 1999.
In sum, the situation in Spain is very different from the other countries dis-
cussed: there is no crisis of production location, employment as well as production
schedules are increased, and it appears as if the sector is poised for an expansion
of activities over the next years.
France
The situation in France has to be seen against the background of a profound re-
structuring of the industry which took place in the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1980
and 1990, both Renault and Peugeot reduced their workforce in the final assembly
plants by roughly half, and reorganised both their assembly operations and their en-
tire supplier network. The result was that the French car manufacturers were the
only companies to survive the crisis of the early 1990s without foregoing profitability.
The workforce reduction programs, however, also entailed a serious weakening of
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the labour union basis, and this is reflected in several of the agreements negotiated
after 1992.
The agreements in France follow the normal bargaining calendar: almost all are
concluded for a period of 3-4 years, and they are negotiated with the local labour
union sections. Typical of the French situation is that not all unions have signed all
agreements; however, agreements are valid even if only one of the so-called repre-
sentative organisations signs.
The agreements are small in scope, but give detailed regulations on working
time reduction and flexibility in exchange for which companies provide general em-
ployment guarantees and commitments for new hires. The basic idea is to trade
working time flexibility, which will allow the companies to adjust production volume to
fluctuations in demand, to guarantees regarding employment.
These bargaining results have to be seen in light of a corporate strategy to turn
the company into a network of single-model plants, i.e. plants where in principle only
one model will be produced. The agreements thus reflect the struggles between the
workers in different plants for obtaining commitments to produce these models.
Parallel to what happened in the other countries, the French agreements reflect
the nature of French labour relations: competitive unionism produces "lowest com-
mon denominator" agreements, while the weakness of French unions on the shop-
floor makes both a co-ordinated bargaining strategy and a constructive follow-up of
the agreements very hard to pursue.
Belgium
Belgian car plants are in a very particular situation: they are all subsidiaries of com-
panies who have their headquarters in other countries. As a result of this, the car
plants are forced to compete with the other plants, who frequently have important
wage cost advantages (Spain, France) or where labour unions have strong positions
inside corporate decision-making structures (Sweden, Germany). The consequence
of this situation was that the Belgian car plants have often been among the
"pioneers" in such areas as new models of work organisation and working time flexi-
bility (often forcing other plants in the European operations to follow suit). Coupled
with high productivity, quality and flexibility, this situation has allowed the car indus-
try in Belgium (which encompasses five companies: Ford, Opel, Renault, VW and
Volvo) to secure a stable position.
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Since a few years, however, this situation has changed, and many of the Bel-
gian plants now find themselves in a situation where the advantages that they had
previously negotiated with local management have become widely accepted stan-
dards. In this new set-up, other elements including cost, investment subsidies, prod-
uct strategies and flexibility, militate against them. It is fair to say that the 1997 clo-
sure of the Renault plant most likely was the first example of a fundamental restruc-
turing of the Belgian car industry: meanwhile VW Brussels has negotiated a radical
WT agreement in 1998, and Opel Antwerp is currently trying to assure production
volume beyond 2002. It is against this background that the current agreements have
to be seen.
The agreements follow the normal bargaining calendar and are concluded for a
period of 3-4 years by the company union people and the regional/local labour union
officers. Several items reappear in all texts: working time reduction and flexibility,
early retirement and negotiations on out- and in-sourcing. Ford and Opel, moreover,
have explicit investment commitments written into their agreements.
The agreements in Belgium therefore have to be seen as attempts to consoli-
date the position of the plants in the European groups. The closure of Renault Vil-
voorde, however, demonstrates that this may turn out to be a tenuous strategy: de-
spite its pilot role inside the Renault group, management pushed through the closure
in 1997 nonetheless.
(Table 1 here)
The agreements in comparative perspective
What is perhaps most apparent in this analysis of the different types of collective
agreements in the car industries of five of the main European car producing indus-
tries (schematically represented in table 1), is that there is a wide array of different
instruments being developed in the different countries. Most likely this is a result of
the very different labour union structures as well as the prevailing institutions of col-
lective bargaining: the strong works councils in the German car industry, for exam-
ple, make them the obvious strategic agents, whereas the decentralised nature of
labour relations and union structures in the UK or France make it very hard to pur-
sue more co-ordinated strategies.
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The second important observation is that there is very little co-ordination
among the different initiatives. In Spain today, and in Belgium before the last crisis,
the particular competitive advantages were exploited by unions to cushion their al-
ready relatively beneficial situation. However, as the Renault case illustrated, this
strategy might backfire. Currently, all the unions in the European car industry are
engaged in a similar competitive struggle, and it is likely that without more co-
ordination of strategies and negotiations, the unions will simply be facing the same
types of problems at every low point in the cycle. Table 1 lists the results of the
analysis.
4.2. Company analyses
Since the problems in the European car industry are increasingly similar across dif-
ferent national industries, a purely national approach is bound to encounter limits:
while it may be possible to retain competitive advantages for a certain period, the
logic of international competition --between plants as much as between companies--
will rapidly lead to a situation where plants in other countries are forced to adopt
similar, perhaps even farther-reaching measures. And, since labour is the only pro-
duction factor that is supposed to be subject to change --because prices for parts as
well as material are considered given on a world market-- the result is a downward
competitive spiral of primary and secondary working conditions.
Only GM Europe has explicitly turned this competitive model into a new com-
pany philosophy, with the Template project,2 but it is implicitly present in most of the
negotiations in different countries during the last few years. It mattered in the Ren-
ault Vilvoorde debate, VW has an internal bench-marking model along similar lines,
and most car companies prepare the production and launch of new models on the
basis of internal comparisons of productivity, quality, delivery and cost.
This section will analyse recent agreements in two companies --GM Europe
and Renault-- from this broader perspective. Contrary to section 4.1., which provided
a static comparative perspective, this section will try to understand the dynamic as-
pects of the process of negotiating agreements that aim at securing production and
employment. It will put the agreements in a broader perspective of increased inter-
                                               
2
 An excellent overview of the project and union responses can be found in (Eller-Braatz and Klebe 1998);
Rehfeldt 1998 provides a relevant analysis of the Renault Vilvoorde crisis.
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plant competition and competitive bench-marking, and will try to understand the
competition on working conditions that is implicit in most agreements.
GM Europe
GM Europe has assembly plants in several European countries: Germany, where
roughly 44000 workers are employed in four plants, the UK, with 9000 workers in two
plants, Spain, where 9100 workers are employed in one plant, and Belgium, with
8000 workers in one plant. Since the early 1990s, the company has sought to mod-
ernise its European operations, and has adopted the strategy of experimenting in
different areas in single plants and then generalise the results from these experi-
ments to other. In the late 1980s, for example, a then revolutionary working time
agreement was negotiated in Antwerp, including 10-hour shifts, which then became
a benchmark for working time arrangements in other plants. And after the fall of the
Berlin wall, the Eisenach plant in eastern Germany, which was built in 1991, rapidly
became a laboratory for new models of work organisation. Since 1996, this approach
to the optimisation of production was formalised and generalised through the TEM-
PLATE project, which aims at copying all the relevant best practice production, or-
ganisational and even architectural parameters exactly onto other plants.
This competitive bench-marking model provides the background for the agree-
ments that were negotiated in the GM Europe plants in 1997 and 1998, and it is
therefore no surprise that, despite the sometimes profoundly different union struc-
tures and bargaining traditions in the different countries, the agreements share many
features.
The similarities are clearest when the agreements in Opel Germany and Bel-
gium are compared. The agreements were concluded in January and March of 1998
and both secure employment, investment and production for the next five years, as
well as a commitment by management to secure the future well beyond 2003 by
planning the production of a new car in these countries. In exchange, the works
council and unions agreed to a series of measures that are very similar in the two
countries: an increase in working time flexibility through and expansion of the exist-
ing time corridor system, support in the search for productivity improvements, and
lower wage increases than usual. In order to avoid layoffs during the period covered
by the contract, the company and the unions will initiate voluntary measures such as
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early retirement, part-time work and through the discussion of out- and insourcing
measures.
As was to be expected, these arrangements had implications for other GM
Europe plants. Literally a day after the agreement in Belgium was concluded, con-
cern was voiced over the survival of the Vauxhall plant in Luton. Despite the lower
wage costs in the UK, GM management maintained, car production was 30% more
expensive there than on the continent. Two reasons were given: lower productivity
and the unfavourable Sterling exchange rate. After a few critical days, unions and
management agreed that the possible closure of the plant could be forestalled if
production costs fell to the level of the German and Belgian plants. Moreover, both
expected a shift in the government's exchange rate policy, which would contribute to
the increased competitiveness of the plant. Thus the union accepted to participate in
a massive drive to raise productivity by 30%; since wages already were relatively low
in Vauxhall, no wage cuts were discussed, and working time flexibility was already
on a par with arrangements in the other countries.
Even the Spanish operations follow, at least in part, this pattern. In Spain, Opel
negotiated an extension of machine time through working time flexibility, including
Saturday work, and management and the union will jointly monitor new investment
projects to secure the long-term competitiveness of the Spanish plant.
As a result of these negotiations, Opel plants in different countries are slowly
converging on the same principles of work organisation (teams) and working time
(time corridors). In all plants, unions are engaged in productivity drives, and in ex-
change receive and discuss investment commitments for the future. Table 2 com-
pares the different agreements.
(Table 2 here)
In order to understand how these different situations ended up in similar ar-
rangements across the GM Europe operations, it is necessary to draw attention to
the competitive dynamic at the basis of the process and how management was able
to exploit that. For particular reasons, related to the acceptance by the workforce,
the relative position of the unions, or the general  situation, one plant would be
picked out as a pilot on working time or work organisation. The agreement then con-
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cluded in this "most favourable" setting is presented as a standard to every other
plant, who has no alternative but to follow suit, else it might find itself in a less fa-
vourable position in the next round of model planning.
Renault
Over the last five years, since the onset of the crisis in the car industry, Renault has
gone through an aggressive restructuring program. The origins of this restructuring
program are found in the way the company was forced to deal with the financial cri-
sis and virtual bankruptcy it went through in the early 1980s. Since that period, the
company has adopted two broad lines in its reorganisation: the first was a consistent
search for a lower break-even point, through massive workforce reductions (roughly
50% between 1984 and 1994) and increased outsourcing (currently Renault ac-
counts for only roughly 16% of the value-added in a car); the second consisted of an
aggressive new model line-up, which exploits the cost advantages of mass produc-
tion with the rents associated with niches and is best seen in the generalisation,
across market segments, of the "monospace" concept (found in the Espace, Scénic
and Twingo).
These two strategies became the basis for the adjustment in the 1990s. After
having roughly doubled labour productivity in final assembly and increased out-
sourcing, management adopted a plan to restructure production over different plants.
Gradually, the Renault production network in France and abroad was to be turned
into a network of single-model plants (meaning in practice plants which would pre-
dominantly produce one model), thus allowing for a more rational amortisation of
investment costs. The agreements signed in the Renault group since 1992 have to
be seen in the context of this broad management strategy. Increasing working time
flexibility, which is a central element in all agreements, allows for a more focused
investment strategy, and an investment write-off curve that follows demand more
closely. Furthermore, since plants are assigned the production of specific models,
the degree of flexibility, quality and the productivity level are crucial decision pa-
rameters for the future of investment.
The Renault agreements very clearly demonstrate how this competition be-
tween plants played out --and how it led to the dramatic closure of the Vilvoorde
plant in 1997. The plant in Belgium (RIB) was the first to discuss a reorganisation of
working time. In 1993, an agreement was negotiated, which allowed for different lev-
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els of working time flexibility: 9 hours per day, 35 to 45 hours per week, 3 to 5 days
per week, and a de facto fork of 13 to 21 days per month.
Responding to this initial agreement, other plants, primarily those in France,
were forced to follow. Even though the agreements concluded in France did not
adopt the wide-ranging forms of flexibility then found in Belgium, they accepted the
principle of adapting working time to fluctuations in demand. In the same period, the
Spanish Renault plants also began experimenting with new working time patterns: in
1993 and 1994, they negotiated an extension of machine time by working on  12
Saturdays a year. Thus, by 1996, almost all assembly plants in the Renault group
were operating on a flexible working time schedule. Table 3 lists the most important
elements of the current agreements.
(Table 3 here)
In 1996 and 1997 these developments took a tragic turn, when Renault an-
nounced the almost simultaneous closure of plants in Portugal and in Belgium and a
social plan in France to reduce the Renault workforce by another 15000, spread
over five years. Against the background of these brutal decisions, Renault manage-
ment negotiated new working time agreements in all its French plants, in which many
points which up until then had been highly problematic in the discussions with the
labour unions --such as, for example, a third night shift, special week-end shifts and
the generalisation of working time accounts-- were accepted, in order to safeguard
production and employment and, prospectively, in a competitive bidding process to
obtain production assignments for new models.
5. Evaluation
An evaluation of the agreements is difficult, in part because most of them were con-
cluded only recently, and their actual short- as well as long-term effects are still
somewhat hard to understand. On the whole, however, they seem to be relatively
effective in safeguarding given employment levels in the short run. All texts guaran-
tee a given employment level, and some even mention new hires. Moreover, the
perhaps unavoidable workforce reductions in the future will be dealt with in a socially
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responsible way through early retirement programs and part-time early retirement
programs for the older workers.
Yet, as the dramatic Renault Vilvoorde closure, and to a lesser extent the
Vauxhall Luton crisis suggest, the agreements are unable to solve the broader em-
ployment problem related to excess capacity. In both cases, the closure decision
took place in the context of agreements securing employment in other plants. Since,
in principle, all plants are in the same situation, those with the strongest national in-
stitutions --in the European context this refers primarily to the German works coun-
cils-- have the best hand in this game.
One important point is shared by all agreements: they are in essence manage-
ment-driven, to the extent that unions react to or anticipate future management deci-
sions. However, precisely because they are management-driven, they are also tools
for management to reorganise companies according to its expectations --or better:
their effects are, again, contingent upon the strength of national institutions or reflect
the "national" concerns of management (closing another plant in France would, after
the restructuring in the 1980s, been impossible for Renault management; hence the
Portuguese and Belgian victims). This situation, then, is likely to lead to a process of
progressive under-cutting of agreements reached elsewhere. Even the strong Ger-
man Opel union and Works Council, for example, was forced to accept more working
time flexibility and smaller wage increases in the agreements, in exchange for in-
vestment guarantees for the next five years.
This competitive underbidding is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the
agreements: as long as only one plant has an advantage in management's eyes, its
future may be relatively secure. When, however, the measures in these agreements
are generalised across the entire European operations and thus de facto have be-
come new standards, the competitive advantage has disappeared and only a new
round, involving more concessions, will then be able to secure the plant's future.
In principle more co-ordination among unions in different countries could pre-
vent this. The European Works Councils (EWC) set up in each of the companies,
which would lead to more agreement on minimum standards to be adopted by all
plant delegations in their negotiations. However, as the national comparisons dem-
onstrated, most of the agreements follow national instead of European patterns.
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6. Are alternative strategies possible?
Since these agreements, which aim at securing employment and investment, are
typically defensive, short-term instruments and, perhaps most importantly of all, fol-
low management's idea of company restructuring, unions may soon find themselves
in the situation again that the agreements initially tried to avoid. The excess capacity
problem may have been side-stepped for a while, but it has not disappeared. Thus
the search for organisational and strategic alternatives becomes all the more urgent.
The premise of the alternatives discussed below is that they address the core
of management's strategies. As discussed before, the main reason why working time
assumed such a prominent place in the current situation, is that appears to provide a
basis for linking management concerns for flexibility in order to write off heavy capi-
tal investments to union strategies of working time reduction as a way of safeguard-
ing jobs. Such a link, however, engaged the unions in a regressive competitive spi-
ral.
What follows starts by providing the outlines of an alternative strategy, located
in the organisation of production and work, which avoids this increasingly impossible
situation for labour unions, and which builds on the relatively simple idea that more
people and less machines can do more cost-effectively what less people and more
machines are doing now. The second section ties this organisational alternative into
a broader EU-wide policy for industrial restructuring. The third section then develops
the new role of the EWC in this strategy and how they have the potential to be the
main agents of change in the multinational car companies.
6.1. Avoiding the squeeze: labour-intensive organisational alternatives
The central idea of organisational alternatives is that labour unions are not against
the search for competitiveness—in fact, they are willing to support the manufacturers
in it—but they are unwilling to accept that competitiveness can only be found in
wages and working conditions with dire employment consequences.
The search for micro-organisational alternatives starts by dissociating the ex-
cess capacity problem and its employment effects. For employers this link is self-
evident, since, given the technological level of the industry, for a given number of
cars a „fixed“ (but increasingly smaller) number of working hours is necessary. Thus
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a reduction in cars produced implies a reduction in the number of hours worked.
What employers leave up to the unions, then (in the best case), is to decide whether
work should be re-distributed among all those who work, or by sending workers into
early retirement.
However, excess capacity does not necessarily express itself in reduced net
employment. Excess capacity means simply that more cars can be made than can
be sold; underemployment means that more labour is available than is necessary to
make what needs to be produced. Up until now, manufacturers have unilaterally de-
cided to adjust the volume of work—through layoffs or working time reorganisation—
and leave the labour intensity (i.e. the ratio of labour to capital needed for the pro-
duction of a car) untouched. The previous section analysed some of the problems
with that strategy. Yet it is possible to reorganise production so that more workers
are necessary for the same production volume. The question is how to do that with-
out raising production costs.
To anyone thinking about the car industry two basic stylised facts are central.
First, the turn toward lean production in the EU car industry over the last five to ten
years has coincided with an increase in process standardisation („taylorisation“),
which ignores the skills basis that is available among (north-West) European car
workers. Today, more skills are needed, not for actual use in production, but to solve
problems that may emerge when „flexible“ machinery breaks down.
Car plants are extremely expensive: factory halls, assembly lines and robots
are all more or less dedicated to particular models. When a company buys a ma-
chine, this is written off over the course of the product cycle, usually four or five
years. Usually technology is either obsolete by then, or cannot be used for a new
model, so a new one is purchased, which follows the same cycle. It is important to
note that classical accounting conventions in many regards militate against workers,
since investment in human resources is discounted as a cost or a tax in most cases.
This explains in large measure why lean production techniques focus almost solely
on labour productivity, i.e. reducing the amount of labour needed in production.
If we combine these two insights, an alternative micro-economic strategy
seems to be possible, which invests less in machines and more in people, i.e. uses
the flexibility inherent in the skills basis of the car workers to compensate for the lack
of flexibility in (rigid) machinery. By substituting labour for machines, and thus raising
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total factor productivity --even if labour productivity is slightly lower than in the cur-
rent situation-- cars can be produced more cost-effectively, because capital invest-
ment is very low. In other words: even though labour productivity can be lower than
in conventional assembly, implying that less cars can be built with more workers, but
since fixed costs are considerably lower, overall production costs fall.3
The basic elements of such an alternative labour-intensive production model
are not new. In fact, they build on a radical extension of demands that have long
been on labour union agendas: decentralised team-work, stationary assembly of
larger sub-modules, and high skills and thus higher wages. But it puts the "older"
claims, which were mainly concerned with the quality of work, in a new perspective:
sustaining employment in the face of dramatic excess capacity. Table 4 compares
conventional "lean production" assembly with such a team-based high-skill produc-
tion model, illustrating the potential for a broad new social pact in the industry. More
details on actual cases where such an assembly method has been used, can be
found in appendix 1 to this report.
As Table 4 suggests, this organisational model has another advantage, on the
demand side: it allows for a product market strategy which is based on more flexibil-
ity, customisation and higher value added, so that --despite the possible lower pro-
duction volume in the future (as a result of exogenous pressures, such as macro-
economic evolution, environmental concerns and cultural evolution)-- profit margins
per car increase. In other words, it is no longer necessary to increase volume to sta-
bilise profit rates; in still other words, and here is the potential for a new social pact
for the industry, employment as well as profits evolve independently of production
volume.
(table 4 here)
The benefits of the model thus seem to be found in different areas: numerical
and product flexibility; lower capital investment costs; the link to product develop-
ment is easier to make; it works for high-end, quasi-customised cars, as well as for
relatively simple mass produced cars.
                                               
3
 For more details on evaluating the costs and benefits of different production systems, see Engström, Jonsson
et al. 1994; Engström, Jonsson et al. 1994.
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6.2. Structural policy for restructuring: sectoral industrial policies
Politically, it is possible to link this micro-economic alternative to the existing indus-
trial policies at the EU-level. The European commission has understood, it seems,
the perverse effects of its policies: instead of support for regions in problems, struc-
tural fund money is increasingly used as a competitive subsidy to attract companies.
In 1996 there was a short quarrel between EU-Commissioner Van Miert and the re-
gional prime minister Kurt Biedenkopf in Sachsen; in 1997, after the announcement
by Renault of the plant closure in Vilvoorde, Van Miert raised the issue again. This
novel political sensitivity could be exploited by the labour unions, who could make
this transfer of jobs –-not, it is important to emphasise, a net gain of jobs—a political
issue. What seems necessary is a reorientation of EU structural policy that, instead
of subsidising excess capacity, supports a re-tooling of the old plants to make better
cars under better working conditions.
The EWCs could then become the place where the actual contents of such a
re-tooling of existing plants is discussed. The often well-trained and experienced
work force in the companies allows for the introduction of new, more complicated
products, new assembly concepts such as the one presented above, and increased
flexibility.
Such a new product market strategy has major implications in many areas,
which require a place on the EWC agenda. It implies a revision of product develop-
ment concepts: design for assembly is both a necessity and an opportunity, since it
allows for a smoother incorporation of the assembly workers' ideas. This needs to be
linked to alternatives in terms of work organisation (see below). Supplier policies as
well need to change. In principle—this may well turn out to be a necessity—
suppliers’ organisation should also be reorganised to fit new products and assembly
methods. Training methods need to provide even broader skills than found in many
northern-European plants today.
In principle, all these areas could be treated in the EWC and its sub-
commissions. Because of the agreements discussed in section 4, the situation is not
critical: employment and production is, in most plants, secured for at least four years,
which allows for a prospective treatment of these issues in the EWC.
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6.3. A new role for European works councils
A survey conducted for the EMF in 1998 showed that for local unionists EWCs are
an instrument to further work in their home plants. They are regarded as a useful tool
for gathering information, and as a forum to understand the union and labour rela-
tions situation in other countries. In specific cases, meetings in the EWC even al-
lowed unionists to put management claims about labour relations in plants in other
countries in a better perspective. Yet importantly, the EWC and the surrounding un-
ion-only institutions were rarely used as a forum to co-ordinate union action across
different plants in Europe.
Several studies have indicated that management has a different view of EWCs.
For them, the EWC is a useful forum to explain corporate restructuring processes
and marshal support for that. This is perhaps most obvious from the themes dis-
cussed during EWC meetings. More than half of the points on the agendas of EWC
meetings deal with issues that generally fall outside the conventional domains of
union negotiations or works councils: product market strategies, plant locations,
supplier policies, investment plans, etc.
This comparison between management and union policies regarding EWCs
suggests that the main problems with the EWC are related to the way they fit or do
not fit into the existing union structures. Unionists from different countries see the
value of a EWC primarily if not exclusively in what it can do to further union work “at
home,” not in what it can do as a separate level of industrial relations alongside the
plant and national structures. If unionists were able to use the EWC as a tool for
dealing with other issues, often of a more strategic nature, the EWC activities would
not any longer just feed into local work, but be truly complementary, helping union-
ists to deal with local issues when necessary, and treating broader issues --even
from a position with “soft” information rights-- as well. Since management seems to
be deploying the EWC in this broader way, the road is open for unionists to do the
same.
Thus EWCs would gradually become forums for co-ordination across plants in
different European countries, where minimum standards could be agreed either cen-
trally or among unionists, so that the competitive underbidding process typical of the
current situation could be halted. As with all such institutions which lack hard sanc-
tioning capacities, it only works if all members participate: one defection would set a
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new downward spiral in motion. Importantly, therefore, the preferences of all the un-
ion members have to be taken into account; a simple adoption of the "highest" stan-
dards would almost certainly lead to new tensions among unionists. Conversely,
raising the minimum standards regarding working time and wages in the "lowest
standard" countries also will create local incentives for competition on increase pro-
ductivity and quality, a considerably more stable competitive model than cost-based
competition.
Co-ordinating activities across different European plants then logically makes
the EWC the appropriate forum for the implementation of EU structural policy for in-
dustrial restructuring. EU funding could be made dependent upon a plan for re-
tooling agreed in the EWC, whereby the labour union representatives in the EWC
push for a labour-intensive, high-skill organisational model along the lines sketched
above.
Such a reorientation is less of a departure from current practice than one might
think: today, the EWC is already a forum for discussions on industrial restructuring --
but primarily on management's terms. In order to avoid a social catastrophe in the
car industry in the years to come, labour unions need to re-appropriate that domain.
The strategic, policy and organisational alternatives outlines above, may make that
possible.
7. Conclusion
This report has presented an analysis of the current situation in the EU car industry.
Its main argument was that the excess capacity crisis that we are facing, requires
new instruments and strategies in order to safeguard employment and keep the in-
dustry competitive.
The agreements, currently concluded, which aim at securing employment and
investment, are important as means to stabilise the situation. However, in longer-
term perspective, these agreements introduce a dimension of competition between
plants and labour unions that is very likely to generate a downward competitive spi-
ral. Consequently, alternatives have to go beyond the conventional approaches.
The report suggested such an alternative industrial model that consists of two
elements: a search for a labour-intensive competitive model, which, by relying on
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flexible workers' skills instead of expensive capital equipment, is more cost-compe-
titive, and a European-level industrial policy to re-tool older plants. Such a model,
which in essence builds on labour union demands for more and better work, allows
us to avoid an employment crisis in the future --even in an age of structural excess
capacity.
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Appendix 1: Real-world examples of team-based, labour intensive assembly
methods
(These examples are taken from Åke Sandberg ed. (1995) Enriching Production. Perspectives on Volvo's Udde-
valla plant as an alternative to lean production. Aldershot, Avebury; and Christoph Midler (1993) L’auto qui
n’existait pas. Paris, Intereditions)
Volvo Uddevalla
The Volvo plant in Uddevalla made cars without the use of an assembly line, but instead relied on
small autonomous teams of highly-skilled workers who, in group, assembled an entire car. The plant
closed in 1993 (and reopened last year under slightly different ownership), and most observers attrib-
uted the closure to the poor performance. A discussion ensued between researchers, and ultimately a
consensus emerged that, measured by different methods, labour productivity in the Uddevalla was
roughly on a par with that of other plants (MIT-IMVP researcher John-Paul Mac Duffie applied the
standardised MIT methodology of „The Machine“ to Uddevalla, and calculated that the plant’s labour
productivity was somewhere in the higher third of the observed plants).The Swedish researcher
Berggren calculated a series of broader performance indicators, such as delivery time of customised
cars, model change-over time and the range of options available to the customer, and argued that
because of its inherent flexibility—every car is uniquely made—the plant can produce cars that can
sell with much larger margins than comparable „inflexible“ line assembly plants. To the labour pro-
ductivity and the flexibility argument should be added that the initial capital investment in the plant is
relatively small compared to traditional assembly lines, which sheds a different light on the economic
advantages of the plant.
Some argue that this substitution of capital through labour is possible only in high-
end cars, where customised flexibility matters; for small cars, this production model
is impossible to implement: an assembly line does things more cheaply. The second
example demonstrates that this argument is, at least in principle, incorrect.
Renault Twingo
In the development of the Twingo, Renault faced a problem that was new in the history of the com-
pany. For the first time in its history, production cost was the limiting variable (i.e. the method was
„design to cost:“ the market price of the vehicle was given and fixed, and all that followed had to be in
line with that). This translated, among other things, in a whole series of simple savings among suppli-
ers and machine-tool builders. But it also addressed a problem at the heart of this paper: some of the
technical choices made on the Twingo were, in fact, beyond the initially planned budget. The reason
was simply that because of the relatively high degree of automation, the planned factory would be
more expensive than the Twingo budget initially envisaged. This was a hangover from the previous
generation of product development systems, which started the industrialisation of a new model with a
given technological plateau and then calculated how much the car should cost.
In order to deal with this problem, the industrialisation of the Twingo started from the opposite logic:
given the budgetary constraints, the question became how to design a production system, that would
meet the design-to-cost imperatives. The answer was provided by re-assessing every investment in
terms of the ratio between cost and necessity. If a new machine (system) was more expensive, the
engineers were told to search for (less expensive) alternatives. The way they did this was not by
regularly dropping machines from a relatively fixed list, but by starting from a manual process and
adding machines wherever it appeared more cost-efficient. As a result, assembling a Twingo requires
considerably more manhours than the original industrial plan envisioned, but, in all, it is less expen-
sive, because the capital investment has been kept to what appeared (given the time constraints of
the Twingo project) necessary. Thus the difference between the planned and the actual investment in
the plant that builds the engine has come down from an estimated FF 500 million to FF 170 million;
even the body shop, for obvious reasons the most capital-intensive part of the factory, costs almost
one-third less than initially planned: it is almost 20% less automated than the original plan projected.
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Table 4: Conventional and team-based assembly compared
Conventional assembly
x high fixed costs require high volume
production
x fixed number of posts on the line reduce
quantitative flexibility; hence working time
as a strategic parameter
x relatively low skills, but high wages
x detailed individual task descriptions result
in efficiency losses
x necessary standardisation of products and
parts leads to a low qualitative flexibility,
and indirectly to price wars among
producers
Team-based assembly
x low fixed costs reduce the importance of
production volume
x autonomous teams allow high quantitative
flexibility without working time flexibility
x investment in human resources justify high
wages
x complementary, parallel job design allows
for efficiency gains
x high qualitative flexibility allows for
customised products, which can be sold
with higher profit margins
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